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Solving the Drug Enforcement Dilemma:
Lessons from Economics
Stephen J. Schulhofert
Though no longer perceived as our number one domestic
problem, drugs continue to ravage our inner cities, and drug
cases increasingly clog our courts and prisons. Drug enforcement
expenditures have been growing exponentially, but drug-related
violence continues unabated. Recent national figures show anoth-
er depressing upsurge in emergency room admissions attribut-
able to heroin and cocaine,1 and usage of marijuana and LSD
among young adults (aged nineteen to twenty-eight) appears to
be rising again.'
Skeptics wonder whether drug prohibition is worth its costs.
But legalization is a complex and risky proposition, with political
acceptability verging on zero. Thus, we redouble our commitment
to vigorous enforcement of drug laws. Each year, the President's
Office of National Drug Control Policy calls for another round of
increases in expenditure for investigation, prosecution, and im-
prisonment of drug dealers. Yet success on this front is elusive
and partly self-defeating. The billions we invest seldom bring
tangible results, and dramatic drug seizures, when they occur,
are rapidly offset by new shipments and alternate sources of
supply. Worst of all, the genuine victories, which disrupt distri-
bution, curtail availability, and raise street prices, only set off
new waves of turf war violence and fuel predatory crime to fi-
nance the drug needs of habitual users.
t Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
Studies in Criminal Justice at the University of Chicago. I am grateful for the comments
of Albert Alschuler, Gary Becker, Frank Easterbrook, David Friedman, William Landes,
Norval Morris, Richard Posner, Peter Reuter, and Geoffrey Stone.
See Drug Emergencies Rising, U.S. Reports, Boston Globe 72 (Oct 5, 1993). The
sharp increase in emergency room admissions from 1991 to 1992, 18 percent for cocaine
and 34 percent for heroin, appears attributable, at least in part, to the aging of the popu-
lation of heavy drug users.
2 Sandy Rovner, Drug Habits of Young Adults: Use of Marijuana, LSD is Up While
Heavy Drinking Continues, Washington Post Z7 (July 27, 1993).
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Is there another way? We need a strategy that maintains our
commitment to drug prohibition but breaks the counterproductive
cycle in which enforcement aggravates drug-related crime.
A straightforward and workable means to break this vicious
cycle exists, but to achieve it, we need a radical reversal of pri-
orities. We need to discard our preoccupation with the interna-
tional cartels and our obsession with tracking down "Mr. Big."
We should instead emphasize both public health approaches such
as education and treatment (traditionally favored by liberals) and
vigorous street-level enforcement (traditionally disdained by lib-
erals and conservatives alike). To see why, we must think clearly
about the distinct harms caused by dangerous drugs and about
some basic lessons in the economics of supply and demand.
I. THE COSTS OF PROHIBITION
The resources absorbed by the drug war continue to grow. At
the federal level, the drug enforcement budget was an impressive
$1.5 billion in fiscal year 1981, and it has grown to $4.7 billion in
fiscal year 1988, $11 billion in fiscal year 1991, and a recom-
mended $13 billion for 1994.' Drug distribution offenses now
represent roughly 40 percent of all federal prosecutions and 50
percent of all admissions to federal prison.4
State and local expenditures for drug enforcement are more
difficult to quantify but are undoubtedly substantial. A 1987
study by Wharton Econometrics estimated state and local outlays
for drug investigation at $5 billion for 1986,' and these expen-
ditures have grown substantially since. State and local drug ar-
rests grew 59 percent from 1981 to 19866 and climbed an addi-
tional 23 percent from 1986 to 1991.' The percent of prisoners
convicted of drug offenses has risen from 7 percent of all admis-
sions to state prison in 1980 to 32 percent of all admissions in
1990.' State and local outlays for courts and prisons have
likewise skyrocketed
' Office of Management and Budget, Federal Drug Control Funding FY 1994, Budget
Summary 4, 147 (1993) ("Budget Summary, 1994") (numbers are rounded).
' Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1992 485,
491 (1993).
' See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Conse-
quences, and Alternatives, 245 Science 939 (Sept 1, 1989). See also Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics, Drugs, Crime and the Justice System 126 (1992).
6 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs and Crime Facts, 1991 8 (1992).
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs and Crime Facts, 1992 9 (1993).
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 1992 10 (1993).
See Office of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP"), 1994 National Drug Control
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The costs of the drug war go well beyond these expenditures
for law enforcement. Preoccupation with drugs means less atten-
tion for federal and state crimes that do far more direct harm,
including violent crime, financial fraud, toxic pollution, and pub-
lic corruption," not to mention other vital federal and state con-
cerns such as education, prenatal care, housing, and nutrition.
If vigorous enforcement could rid us of the manifold costs of
addictive drugs, it might be worthwhile. But for some time skep-
tics have questioned whether drug prohibition can cure the evils
of drug trafficking. Drug enforcement, like alcohol prohibition in
the 1920s, appears to reduce consumption, but it may exacerbate
public health problems due to impurities of unregulated product
and inflated prices that trigger criminogenic effects, such as in-
creases in predatory crime to support drug habits, battles among
drug dealers seeking lucrative turf, and violent death to suspect-
ed informants, competitors, and innocent bystanders, including
inner-city children caught in the cross fire.
II. LEGALIZATION
These concerns have spawned a now familiar debate over
legalization. Critics wonder whether legalization could possibly
entail costs comparable to the tens of billions of dollars spent in
direct outlays for drug enforcement, together with the costs of
predatory drug crime and other harms attributable to prohibi-
tion."
But legalization is itself costly and very risky. Proponents of
legalization are generally vague about critical matters of detail,
such as the precise form of regulation-if any-that would accom-
pany decriminalization, how black markets and sales to minors
would be prevented, and how the regulatory regime applicable to
psychoactive prescription drugs such as Valium would be affect-
ed.'2 Moreover, the public health effects of legalizing a danger-
ous drug like crack cocaine are uncertain and on key points prob-
ably unknowable. Although most users of alcohol-and marijua-
na-are able to consume these drugs in moderation without be-
coming addicted, we cannot be sure that this is true of cocaine or
Strategy: Reclaiming Our Communities from Drugs and Violence 99 (1994).
10 See John G. Haaga and Peter Reuter, The Limits of the Czar's Ukase: Drug Policy
at the Local Level, 8 Yale L & Policy Rev 36, 47 (1990).
See, for example, Nadelmann, 245 Science at 939 (cited in note 5).
12 See James Jacobs, Imagining Drug Legalization, 101 The Public Interest 28 (Fall
1990).
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PCP. If assumptions about these matters turned out to be overly
optimistic, the public health consequences for an entire genera-
tion could be catastrophic." These concerns do not necessarily
indicate that prohibition is the "safe" course, for prohibition may
also have catastrophic public health and public resource effects.
But fear of the unknown does mean that legalization is unlikely
to carry the day in the forum of public opinion any time soon.
When Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders recently suggested study-
ing the possibility of legalization, she was quickly rebuked by the
White House, which issued a statement that President Clinton
"is firmly against legalizing drugs, and he is not inclined in this
case to even study the issue."
The risks of legalization, together with hard political reali-
ties, mean that public policy must find a way to break the perni-
cious cycle of criminogenic drug enforcement without abandoning
prohibition and without affording abusers limitless access to
potentially dangerous drugs. In terms of practical choices, what
are the options?
III. STRATEGY, RESOURCES, AND PRIORITES
Drug control strategists offer approaches that run the gamut,
from crop eradication in the Andes to awareness programs in our
suburban classrooms. The principal options include education,
treatment, domestic law enforcement, border control, and inter-
national initiatives to reduce drug production. Much of the de-
bate centers on the effectiveness of each measure. Which of these
strategies can work?
While education probably helps discourage middle-class drug
use, it seems much less effective-perhaps totally ineffective-in
lowering consumption by ghetto crack addicts who have few other
opportunities to escape bleak prospects. 5
Treatment programs have had mixed success. Many
approaches work quite well, 6 but no program can claim com-
'" See John Kaplan, Taking Drugs Seriously, 92 The Public Interest 32 (Summer
1988).
" See Stephen Labaton, Surgeon General Suggests Study of Legalizing Drugs, NY
Times A23 (Dec 8, 1993).
5 See Gilbert J. Botvin, Substance Abuse Prevention: Theory, Practice, and Effective-
ness, in Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson, eds, 13 Crime and Justice: A Review of Re-
search 461, 478-87, 502-03 (University of Chicago Press, 1990).
" A recent, thorough review of the literature concludes that "[tihe major drug treat-
ment modalities ... have all been shown to be successful by most outcome crite-
ria.... Clients entering treatment under legal coercion do as well by most outcome crite-
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pletely to "cure" every addict. Heroin users frequently relapse
when they return to the social environment that cues the drug
experience. Cocaine addicts require a combination of social, psy-
chological, and medical services, and drugs to block cocaine eu-
phoria and craving have only recently become available. Imper-
fect outcomes increase the inherent vulnerability of publicly fund-
ed programs needed to treat the indigent. In an era when taxpay-
ers hesitate to support neonatal care for the "deserving poor," or
even roads for their own cars and schools for their own children,
underclass drug addicts make unlikely candidates for public
largesse.
Border control is now widely acknowledged to be a virtually
hopeless endeavor. 7 Given our commitments to international
commerce, travel, and tourism, only a small fraction of the drugs
entering the country can be intercepted." From 1981 to 1987,
the amount of cocaine seized at the border rose dramatically,
from 1.7 tons to about forty tons; nonetheless, the amount of
cocaine imported rose rapidly during the same period, and the
street price declined sharply. 9 Even if we could double or triple
our rate of success in spotting drugs at the border, the effect on
the street price would be insignificant. Because production and
importation costs are only about 10 percent of the total cost of
distribution to the user, doubling or tripling costs incurred up to
the border point has little effect.2° If our borders become less
porous, then distributors can simply throw more drugs at us,
ensuring that the desired quantities continue to get through. 1
ria as volunteer clients and may stay in treatment longer." M. Douglas Anglin and Yih-
Ing Hser, Treatment of Drug Abuse, in Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson, eds, 13 Crime
and Justice: A Review of Research 393 (University of Chicago Press, 1990).
"7 See Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave, Sealing the Borders: The
Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction 122 (Rand Corporation,
1988).
"' Federal law enforcement experts estimate that 70 to 90 percent of the cocaine ex-
ported to the United States reaches the streets here. See Joseph B. Treaster, Military Is
Faulted on Effort to Stem Drug Traffic, NY Times A8 (Sept 27, 1991).
'9 Peter Reuter, Can the Borders Be Sealed?, 92 The Public Interest 51, 52-53
(Summer 1988).
20 Reuter, Crawford, and Cave, Sealing the Borders at xi (cited in note 17). See also
Mark A. R. Kleiman, Against Excess 134 (Harper Collins, 1992); Peter Reuter, Quantity
Illusions and Paradoxes of Drug Interdiction: Federal Intervention into Vice Policy, 51 L &
Contemp Probs 233, 234-35 (Winter 1988).
" One economic model predicts that doubling our rate of interdiction would raise
street prices by 13 percent for marijuana and by 6 percent for cocaine. See Peter Reuter
and Mark A. R. Kleiman, Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug Enforcement, in
Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, eds, 7 Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Re-
search 289, 316-22 (University of Chicago Press, 1986).
2071
212 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1994:
Or worse, they can switch to more potent, concentrated, and easi-
ly concealed drugs as interdiction efforts become more effective.
International initiatives likewise have inherently limited
potential. Foreign production is difficult to restrict, and efforts to
do so may disrupt the economies and politics of source countries.
Moreover, such initiatives have little impact because new produc-
ing regions are available at little increase in growing costs, and
because growing costs are a small part of the street price.22
While agencies involved in the drug war constantly press for
more resources, most confess that they can make only limited
contributions." Interdiction experts express frustration at the
virtually unlimited quantities to be intercepted and call on the
State Department to enlist source countries in the effort to re-
strict supply. 4 But foreign affairs specialists note that little can
be done to stem production so long as opium and coca crops
promise enormous profit to peasants with no other comparable
source of income. 25 High school educators find their task futile
as long as drugs are readily available on the corner and teenage
dealers sport gold chains, beepers, and fancy cars. Local police
complain that street-level enforcement makes no dent in the
infinitely expandable pool of small-time addict-dealers; the "Big
Fish" and "Fat Cats" remain untouched. State and federal task
forces focus their energies on working up the ladder to "Mr. Big."
But enforcement specialists acknowledge that this effort is
illusory because subordinates and competitors, lured by enor-
mous potential profits, stand ready to step in.
Colombian and American efforts to topple alleged drug lord
Pablo Escobar made these ironies especially visible. Escobar's
capture in 1991 triggered a huge fuss over whether his "gilded
cage" would really prevent him from running the Medellin cartel.
This debate, of course, was quite beside the point. As Tom Cash,
head of the DEA's Miami office, commented, "If Lee Iacocca left,
would Chrysler stop making automobiles?"2 When Escobar later
escaped and was finally captured and killed, officials heralded
the demise of this ultimate "kingpin." Yet the consensus of law
enforcement personnel interviewed at the time was to the effect
22 See Reuter, Crawford, and Cave, Sealing the Borders at vi (cited in note 17).
23 See Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition at 939 (cited in note 5).
•24 See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, 92 The Public Interest 3, 9
(Summer 1988).
2 Id at 9-11.
26 Joseph B. Treaster, Arrest Called Unlikely to Cut Narcotics Shipments to U.S., NY
Times A8 (June 21, 1991).
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that "beyond its symbolism, his death was not expected to affect
the flow of cocaine [through North and South America] or to have
any effect on international efforts to stamp out traffic in [the]
drug ... ."27 The acting administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Agency ("DEA") conceded that the Cali group and others "had
already filled the vacuum."2" Other experts predicted that
Escobar's death would actually make government interdiction
efforts more difficult because the remaining distributors, freed of
their conflict with the Medellin group, would find it easier to col-
laborate and to operate more efficiently.29
The successive "drug czars" who have led the White House
Office of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP") have been
more optimistic. Each year, ONDCP's Annual Report renews the
government's commitment to pursuing all fronts simultaneously,
with increased funds for education, treatment, local enforcement,
high level task forces and so on. This approach makes for appeal-
ing public relations and satisfies agency constituencies, but it
obscures important choices.
The 1994 proposed federal budget, released in April 1993,3"
is summarized in Table 1. The ONDCP proposed spending $1.8
billion for education and community action programs-a $252
million increase over fiscal year 1992, and $2.5 billion for treat-
ment programs-a $387 million increase, while criminal justice
was to receive $5.8 billion, an $866 million increase. 1
27 Robert D. McFadden, Head of Medellin Cocaine Cartel Is Killed by Troops in Co-
lombia, NY Times Al, A7 (Dec 3, 1993).
28 Id.
29 See Joseph B. Treaster, Effort to Curb Drug Flow May Be More Difficult, Officials
Say, NY Times A7 (Dec 4, 1993).
2O 0MB, Budget Summary, 1994 (cited in note 3).
" As Peter Reuter shows, some of these budgetary figures result from arbitrary ap-
portionment of expenditures that will be incurred in any event (at least in the short run).
See Peter Reuter, Setting Priorities: Budget and Program Choices for Drug Control, 1994
U Chi Legal F 145, 148-51. But many of the items in question, especially those involving
the criminal justice system, are directly affected by expenditure decisions and other policy
choices.
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Table I
Federal Drug Control Expenditures
(in millions of dollars, by fiscal years (FY))
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 1993-94
(actual) (enacted) (requested) Change$ %
Treatment 2150.8 2367.7 2538.1 170.4 7.2
Education, Community
Action, & Workplace 1537.6 1524.4 1789.9 265.5 17.4
Initiatives
International 660.4 538.0 490.0 -48.0 -8.9
Initiatives
Interdiction 1960.2 1746.2 1765.2 19.0 1.1
Research 554.5 530.9 548.2 17.2 3.2
Intelligence 98.6 128.7 127.4 -1.3 -1.0
Criminal Justice System 4916.2 5374.8 5782.6 407.7 7.6
--including:
DEA 709.8 756.1 773.8 17.7 2.3
FBI 204.8 218.9 217.5 -1.4 -0.6
U.S. Attorneys 206.7 207.2 207.9 0.7 0.3
Offices
Organized Crime 363.6 385.2 384.4 -0.9 -0.2
Drug Enforcement
Task Forces
Federal 359.9 406.9 501.1 94.1 23.1
Courts
Bureau of 1254.5 1334.0 1466.3 132.3 9.9
Prisons
1992-94
Change$
387.3
252.3
-170.4 -2
-195.0
-6.3
28.8
866.4
64.0
12.7
1.2
20.8
141.1
211.8
Total l1,878.3 12,210.8 13,041.4 830.5 6.8 - 1,163.1
Source: OMB, Budget Summary, 1994 at 147 (cited in note 3).
18.0
16.4
25.8
-9.9
-1.1
29.2
17.6
9.0
6.2
0.6
5.7
39.2
16.9
9.8
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Among the criminal justice expenditures, several already large
budget items continue to grow rapidly. The 18 percent increase in
expenditures for treatment should be compared to the 39 percent
increase for federal courts and the 17 percent increase for
prisons. Both interdiction and international efforts face large
funding cuts-10 percent and 26 percent respectively. However,
published reports suggest that while ONDCP recommends re-
duced emphasis on intercepting drug shipments in the maritime
transit zones, a move that supply reduction experts have urged
for years,32 ONDCP also contemplates increased attention to law
enforcement and'crop reduction in the source countries,33 togeth-
er with a so-called "kingpin strategy" intended to attack drug
distribution hierarchies. 34 These two approaches seem at least
equally futile. 5 What theory of ultimate goals or instrumental
effectiveness guides these choices? The Office of National Drug
Control Policy does not say.
In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,36 Congress sought to
keep priorities visible by requiring ONDCP to identify the re-
sources devoted to supply reduction and demand reduction.37
But ONDCP's first Report, issued in September 1989, responded
by attacking the concept of a supply/demand distinction as "artifi-
cial and counterproductive. 3' The Report disparaged the sup-
ply/demand issue as primarily symbolic and ideological: law en-
forcement critics, it said, dismiss supply reduction as "punitive,"
while they view demand reduction strategies such as education
and treatment as constructive and therapeutic. In reality,
ONDCP claims, law enforcement strategies commonly associated
with supply reduction play a major role in demand reduction:
When street prices for drugs go up, and drug availabili-
ty declines, then fewer people are likely to seek out
drugs and consume them. In other words, a large por-
tion of funding proposed in this report for traditionally
32 See notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
" See ONDCP, Breaking the Cycle of Drug Abuse: 1993 Interim National Drug Con-
trol Strategy 28 (1993) ("1993 Interim Strategy Report"); Joseph B. Treaster, Clinton Alter-
ing Nation's Tactics in Drug Battle, NY Times Al (Oct 21, 1993).
'4 See Treaster, NY Times at Al (cited in note 33).
See Part VIII of this Article.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 USC § 1501 (1990).
37 Id.
' ONDCP, 1989 National Drug Control Strategy 13 (1989).
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understood "supply reduction" is in fact aimed at reduc-
ing demand as well.39
Pursuing this theme, ONDCP Reports consistently seek to
obliterate the coherence of a supply/demand distinction:
Granted, overseas and border activities against drugs
work primarily to reduce supply. But they can have an
important, radiating effect on demand, as well, because
they make the purchase of certain imported drugs more
difficult-and therefore less likely. In much the same
way, drug treatment and education work primarily to
reduce demand, but in so doing they may encourage
suppliers to scale back production and distribution in
an effort to sustain consistent profits.0
This analysis, though superficially sophisticated, obscures
genuine differences and collapses hard choices into a muddle.
There are real choices to be made: between treatment and pun-
ishment; between supply reduction and demand reduction; and
between working up the ladder to kingpins and working down
the ladder to neighborhoods, street-corners, and small-time sell-
ers and buyers. Moreover, these choices determine whether our
efforts will mitigate the scourge of drug abuse or only make it
worse.
We can break the pernicious catch-22 in which each enforce-
ment success makes our drug problem worse than ever. But to do
this, we first need to be clear about the distinct ways in which
drugs harm society.
IV. How DRUGS CAUSE "DRUG-RELATED" CRIME
Drugs cause harm in several distinct ways. Three causal
mechanisms need to be distinguished: pharmacology, economic
compulsion, and organizational dynamics.4
'9 Id at 112-13.
,o Id at 12-13. See also ONDCP, 1991 National Drug Control Strategy 133-34 (1991).
" See Paul J. Goldstein, Drugs and Violent Crime, in N. A. Weiner & M. E.
Wolfgang, eds, Pathways to Criminal Violence 16-48 (Sage Publications, 1989). Except as
otherwise indicated, the discussion in this Part draws on the Goldstein article and the
sources cited therein.
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A. Pharmacological Effects
Many drugs render users excitable or irrational.42 Users
may be prompted to violence or poor judgment.4" Alcohol produc-
es particularly dangerous pharmacological effects; barbiturates
and PCP also are harmful in this way.44
The pharmacological picture is more complex for the drugs
that are central to the enforcement effort-marijuana, cocaine,
and heroin. There is little or no credible evidence linking mari-
juana with violent behavior, but marijuana, like alcohol, can
cause inattention and poor judgment that increase accident risk.
Heroin, an opiate, strongly inhibits violent behavior. Heroin with-
drawal, however, may cause irritability and aggressiveness, par-
ticularly when the user is unable to obtain another "fix." Cocaine
is said to induce an intense mellow "high," suggesting a violence-
inhibiting effect, heightened alertness and energy, which may
tend to reduce carelessness, as well as feelings of omnipotence,
suggesting impaired judgment and increased carelessness. In any
event, after the cocaine "high" comes a "crash" associated with
anxiety, depression, or paranoia; in this condition, the user can
become dangerously aggressive.
Behavioral effects resulting from withdrawal syndrome or
the "crash" may not deserve to be considered pharmacological
because they result from unavailability of the drug rather than
the drug itself. Yet some withdrawal effects seem likely even
under a regime of unrestricted supply. Few cocaine users could
manage to stay permanently "high." More widespread consump-
tion might mean growth in the "withdrawal" problem even if
each user faced a smaller risk of being caught short of supply.
"Withdrawal" effects are therefore partly pharmacological as well
as social.
Other pharmacological effects deserve mention. Especially
tragic are injuries to the fetuses and nursing infants of drug
abusing mothers, which are manifested by crack and fetal alcohol
syndromes. Drugs that lower inhibition or "give courage" may
increase violent crime by persons already predisposed. Injury to
the user's own health is particularly serious for alcohol and nico-
tine. Studies suggest few, if any, serious health effects from mari-
juana, but the opportunity for wide-scale study is, of course, lim-
42 Id at 24.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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ited. The long-term health effects of cocaine and opiate use like-
wise remain unclear and to some extent unknowable. Dramatic
examples of drug-related harm such as toxic reactions, drug over-
dose deaths, and the spread of AIDS among needle-sharing ad-
dicts are more probably the result of black market conditions
than of the drugs themselves.
Finally, pharmacological effects increase the chance that
users will become victims of crime. Drug-related aggressiveness
can provoke violent retaliation against the drug user. Intoxica-
tion, especially in the case of alcohol and opiates, can leave the
user more vulnerable to predatory crime.
Though there is much that we do not know about pharmaco-
logical effects, what we do know is unquestionably sufficient to
support vigorous efforts to discourage drug use.
B. Economic Compulsion
The economic needs of drug users generate predatory crime,
not all of which is violent. Heroin users are said to avoid violent
crime if nonviolent alternatives are available. The principal
forms of crime that support drug habits are thought to be shop-
lifting, prostitution, and drug-dealing itself. Nevertheless, eco-
nomic need often drives drug users to burglary and robbery as
well.
Here prohibition produces a well-known dilemma. In its
effort to discourage consumption, enforcement of prohibition re-
stricts availability and drives up the price, thereby generating
more predatory crime to support the increased economic needs of
drug users. Conversely, street crime by drug addicts, the argu-
ment goes, could be vastly reduced by legalization.
The legalization position has been questioned from two direc-
tions. First, some recent research suggests that although a high
proportion of robberies and other street crimes are committed by
drug users, it is crime that causes drug use rather than the other
way around. Justice Department data indicate that most drug
abusers began their criminal careers and experienced arrest
before trying drugs, 51 percent of them more than a year be-
fore.45 Drugs may simply be one of the luxury consumption
items that predators purchase after a successful score.4"
4 Bureau of Justice Statistics, BJS Data Report 34 (1989).
Goldstein, Drugs and Violent Crime (cited in note 41).
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To the extent that these arguments are valid, drugs do not
"cause" predatory crime, and thus legalization would not reduce
it. Robbers would just have more disposable cash to spend on
luxuries, including drugs. (Legalization would at least permit
more of the fruits of predatory crime to be recycled back into the
legitimate economy.) But once the user becomes addicted, he will
need to commit more crimes than he did before, especially if pro-
hibition has inflated prices.
The benefits of legalization have also been questioned from
the other direction. The White House Office of National Drug
Control Policy, writing on legalization, stated that "[cirimes com-
mitted by addicts to pay for their habits might theoretically de-
cline a bit. But since addicts use drugs-especially cocaine-as
often as they can, less expensive drugs might just as well mean
more frequent purchases and a still-constant need for cash-
producing burglaries and robberies."47
The idea that addicts would use drugs "as often as they can"
conceives of the user's need for drugs as independent of the
amount already consumed and as virtually insatiable. Under this
view, the drug user would commit as many crimes as possible
because, no matter how great his consumption, he would still
want more drugs and need cash to pay for them.
This picture is obviously inapplicable to the non-addict user'
and is contrary to most of what we know about addict consump-
tion, particularly in the case of heroin addicts. Since ONDCP
economists estimate that prices under legalization would be only
about five percent of the current black market price for drugs
like heroin and cocaine, ONDCP must assume that a twenty-fold
increase in consumption would not quench an addict's thirst for
more drugs. Even the crack addict, portrayed in some accounts as
capable of an almost unlimited binge, would surely commit less
predatory crime in these circumstances, if only because of self-
inflicted "incapacitation": the user who gets "high" twenty times
more often each day would hardly be in a position to commit
predatory crime with the same frequency and success.
Undoubtedly, then, legalization would reduce predatory
crime, and by more than "a bit."
" ONDCP, 1989 National Drug Control Strategy at 6 (cited in note 38).
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C. Organizational Dynamics
Lethal turf wars among drug dealers have been vividly docu-
mented. Other crimes connected to the distribution of contraband
goods are also important. Because drug lords need to protect
their organizations against infiltration by rival gangs and the
police, the intimidation and even murder of informants, as well
as suspected informants, become important tools. Large cash
transactions invite robbery and require violent countermeasures
for self-protection. To collect debts, enforce promises, police ex-
pectations about product quality, and enforce the other require-
ments of well-developed commerce, legal process is obviously
unavailable. Thus, lethal violence becomes a crucial means for
governing the system of distribution. Organizational needs also
prompt bribery, extortion, and efforts to corrupt law enforcement.
Like crimes of economic compulsion, organizational crimes
result primarily from prohibition rather than from drug con-
sumption. Systemic violence would essentially disappear with
legalization, just as it has in the liquor industry since the end of
Prohibition. Conversely, more intensive enforcement exacerbates
organizational crime. Higher prices increase the incentive to
attack cash transactions and the need for violent means of self-
defense; enforcement upsets established market arrangements
and creates more need for extra-legal sanctions-such as mur-
der-to preserve existing distribution networks; and undercover
work generates violent retaliation and draconian deterrent strat-
egies for organizational self-protection.
V. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DRUG PROHIBITION
The dilemma of drug enforcement is embedded in these
mixed causes of "drug-related crime." Drug enforcement reduces
consumption and thus reduces the pharmacological harms of
drug use.48 Yet by increasing prices, enforcement increases pred-
atory and organizational crime.
The debate over drug legalization has centered on comparing
the benefits of prohibition, primarily pharmacological, to its costs,
which are reckoned in economic and organizational harms.49
" There are a few qualifications to this point. Some rebellious adolescents may use
drugs because of the illicit aura surrounding them. Prohibition increases death and injury
from impurities.
" See generally Rod L. Evans and Irwin M. Berent, eds, Drug Legalization: For and
Against 21-23 (Open Court Publishing Co., 1992).
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This debate is important but destined to be inconclusive because
no one can reliably estimate the costs and benefits or the precise
ways they would change in response to legalization.
The aim of drug policy is to minimize all three kinds of
harm. But because efforts to reduce pharmacological harm tend
to increase economic and organizational harm, drug control
seems to involve an inherent trade-off, with hidden costs at-
tached to every victory. The problem would be simple if we could
deter consumption without raising prices and drug cartel profits,
but policy planners have assumed that the real world offers no
way to accomplish these seemingly contradictory objectives simul-
taneously.
Whether these objectives are in fact contradictory, however,
is a commonplace issue in economics. To trace the effects of law
enforcement on price, quantity consumed, and supplier profits,
we need to review a few basic principles of supply and demand.
VI. SUPPLY REDUCTION STRATEGIES
Figure 1 presents the economist's basic supply and demand
curves. The line S shows the quantity Q of a product (in this case
cocaine) that distributors will supply at any given price P. They
are willing to supply more as the price of each unit rises. The
line D shows the amount that purchasers will buy. They want to
buy less as the price of each unit rises. In this example, the mar-
ket is in equilibrium at price A, where the quantity X demanded
equals the quantity X supplied.
The effect of law enforcement strategies that reduce supply is
depicted by a new supply line, S'. Because of crop eradication,
border interdiction, punishment of dealers, etc., the distribution
system is willing and able to offer a smaller amount of drugs at
any given price. Conversely, it will need to collect a higher price
in order to continue supplying any given quantity of drugs. The
new equilibrium price is B, where the quantity Y demanded
equals the quantity Y supplied.
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FIGURE 1
Supply Reduction
Under Conditions of Elastic Demand
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Figure 1 shows in graphic form the dilemma we have been
discussing. Successful supply reduction has reduced consumption
from X to Y, but it has raised the price from A to B, creating
increased need for those who do buy to commit predatory crime
to support their purchases.
Has enforcement increased or decreased dealer profits? The
answer depends in part on whether we should consider only the
dealer's monetary profit. When the probability of arrest or the
expected sentence increases, the dealer's non monetary costs in
effect increase, so his overall profit declines. But with these in-
creases in non-monetary cost, the need to protect the organiza-
tion, weed out informants, and corrupt the police becomes great-
er. Some dealers may even turn increased enforcement to their
advantage by informing on competitors, so that they gain a larger
share of sales at the higher prices. Thus, the increase in non-
monetary costs and the corresponding decline in overall profit
have effects on dealer behavior that are in many ways similar to
those that occur with a decrease in monetary costs: the dollar
stakes are higher and incentives for violence increase. So for
most policy purposes, the objective should be to reduce the dollar
revenue accruing to drug distribution.
To determine whether supply reduction has reduced revenue,
we need to know the "elasticity" of demand, that is, the degree to
which demand decreases in response to increases in price. For
[1994:
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the typical addict, demand is probably inelastic. Because he tries
to maintain his level of consumption, the percentage decrease in
his consumption is less than the percentage increase in price.
The casual user is more likely to cut consumption as price rises,
so his demand may be more elastic. But some estimates find that
marijuana demand-largely derived from non-addict, recreational
users-is also inelastic, possibly because marijuana expenditures,
even at currently inflated prices, remain a small part of the
user's income.5° Available estimates nearly all find modest to
substantial inelasticity in the overall demand for heroin and
cocaine, especially in the short run.5
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of supply reduction under con-
ditions of elastic demand. Price rises, but the quantity sold falls
by a proportionately greater amount. Total revenue collected by
drug distributors, represented by the area BOYN, is smaller than
it was before supply reduction, when total revenue was repre-
sented by the area AOXM.In short, supply reduction can reduce consumption and deal-
er revenue, provided that user demand is elastic. But this condi-
tion is unlikely to be satisfied in the market of addict users. In
any event, because supply reduction drives up price, it has unde-
sirable side effects even when aggregate demand is elastic. Those
atypical individuals who have inelastic demand and limited funds
will be driven to increasingly risky and dangerous crimes to sup-
port their drug habits. And although aggregate dealer revenue
drops, individual dealers (the best organized or most violent
ones) can preserve most of their sales as competitors are elimi-
nated. Because prices are higher, these surviving dealers will
wind up with higher cash revenues. And their incentive to use
violent means of self-protection will grow as the value of each
sale increases.
'o See Reuter and Kleiman, Risks and Prices at 299 (cited in note 21). An earlier
study found an elastic demand for marijuana, specifically a 1.5 percent decrease in con-
sumption for each 1 percent increase in price, in one important subsection of the market:
full-time college students. See T. C. Misket and F. Vakil, Some Estimates of Price and
Expenditure Elasticities Among UCLA Students, 54 Review of Economics & Statistics 474-
75 (1972).
" See Reuter and Kleiman, Risks and Prices at 299-300 (cited in note 21). Over the
long run, if lasting price increases deter new users, demand could be highly elastic. See
Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 Journal of Po-
litical Economy 675, 686-87 (Aug 1988).
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FIGURE 2
Supply Reduction
Under Conditions of Inelastic Demand
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Figure 2 illustrates the effect of supply reduction under the
more likely assumption that demand is inelastic. The increase in
price is proportionately much greater than the decrease in quan-
tity. Dealer revenues increase (from COWK to DOZL), even
though enforcement appears to be "succeeding" through crop
eradication, border interdiction, drug seizures, and convictions.
Indeed, the more dramatic the supply reduction success, the more
dealer revenue will increase, not just for some competitors but for
the whole industry. Enforcement successes increase dealer costs
(monetary and non-monetary), but because revenues are also
higher, the incentives for violence once again increase.
VII. DEMAND REDUCTION STRATEGIES
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of reducing demand. With de-
mand represented by line D, the market is in equilibrium at
price E, where the quantity R supplied equals the quantity R de-
manded. As a result of demand reduction efforts, as indicated by
line D', consumers want to buy a smaller quantity of drugs at
any given price. The new equilibrium price is F, where the quan-
tity T supplied equals the quantity T demanded.
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The advantage of demand reduction is clear. Supply reduc-
tion reduces consumption only by driving up price, dealer reve-
nue, predatory crime, and systemic violence. Demand reduction
reduces consumption while lowering price, dealer revenues, and
the incentives for predatory and organizational crime. Demand
reduction makes it possible to cut through the dilemmas of prohi-
bition by reducing the pharmacological harms of drug use and
the criminogenic harms of drug enforcement simultaneously.
VIII. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
The preceding analysis points to demand reduction as a best-
of-both-worlds solution for the dilemmas of drug enforcement.
But how can we make this theoretical prescription operational?
Which strategies will reduce demand?
A. Production And Distribution
Let us begin with foreign crop eradication. By all reports this
is an expensive, politically complex task that offers few prospects
for reducing drug availability.52 But suppose that we can, by
some miraculous feat of statecraft, cut foreign production dramat-
ically. This supply reduction "success" decreases consumption by
raising prices, a largely counterproductive achievement as the
2 Reuter, Crawford, and Cave, Sealing the Borders (cited in note 17); Nadelmann,
The Case for Legalization at 9-11 (cited in note 24).
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prior analysis shows. Border interdiction has exactly the same
faults, as does eradication of domestic marijuana crops; ironical-
ly, marijuana supply reduction tends to steer consumption to-
ward more potent, more easily concealed-and more danger-
ous-drugs like heroin and cocaine. Opponents question whether
these strategies can have any significant impact on availability.
But these expensive policies53 are poor choices, even if-indeed,
particularly if-proponents are right about their potential effec-
tiveness.
What about domestic law enforcement? Where should local
police, DEA agents and U.S. Attorneys focus their attention?
Conventional wisdom stresses the search for "Mr. Big." This ef-
fort takes three concrete forms. First, penalties increase as we
move up the distributional ladder. The U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines provide a multilevel table, derived in part from mandatory
minimums set by Congress, in which punishments rise with each
increase in drug quantities sold.' A low-level dealer convicted of
distributing one kilogram of cocaine or a mere five grams of crack
faces a real-time sentence of sixty-three to seventy-eight months
in prison, a little over five years.5 His supplier, who may have
helped distribute fifteen kilograms of cocaine-not an exception-
ally large quantity these days-must serve 151-188 months,
about fifteen years.56 For the leader of the fifteen kilogram sup-
ply operation, add an additional seven to nine years.57 Drug
"kingpins" face life imprisonment without parole.'
Each of these punishments costs taxpayers hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars to inflict. A 28-year-old "kingpin" can expect to
spend about forty years in prison, at an average of $52,000 in
construction costs for his cell, $19,000-$21,000 in annual operat-
ing expenses, and $4,000-$5,000 in annualized amortization of
capital costs, for a total expenditure of nearly $1 million.59 Mid-
These policies cost nearly $3 billion in fiscal year 1992. See Table 1 at page 214.
', United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2D.1.1(c) (Nov 1993).
Id at §2D1.1(c)(9) (base offense level of 26); id, ch 5, Part A (level 26 guideline
range of 63-78 months for first offender).
" Id at §2D1.1(c)(5) (base offense level of 34); id, ch 5, Part A (level 34 guideline
range of 151-188 months for first offender).
"7 Id at §3B1.1(a) (four-level enhancement for leadership role); id, ch 5, Part A (level
38 guideline range of 235-293 months for first offender).
See 21 USCA § 848(b) (West 1981 & Supp 1993).
5' See Mark A. R. Kleiman and David P. Cavanagh, A Cost Benefit Analysis of Prison
Cell Construction and Alternative Sanctions 12-18 (1990). Kleiman and Cavanagh esti-
mate that, in 1988 dollars, operating costs are likely to average between $19,000 and
$21,000 per year, and start-up and construction costs are likely to run on average be-
tween $4,000 and $5,000 per year on an annualized basis; the result is direct expenses, on
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level dealers whose sales of cocaine reach the 150 kilogram level,
or a total of 1.5 kilograms of crack, face real-time sentences of
twenty years,"0 which will cost $500,000 per inmate to inflict.
Even discounting these expenditures to present value-and ig-
noring the lost productivity of these individuals6 -the invest-
ment in punishment is enormous, and it escalates rapidly as we
ascend the ladder to larger dealers and organizational leaders.
The second key feature of current enforcement policy quali-
fies the first. After snaring a dealer, every drug agent's first
priority is to find the higher-ups. Cooperative defendants are
pumped for information, used as witnesses, and turned into un-
dercover informants. Defendants who offer "substantial assis-
tance" can obtain reduced sentences.62 Result: prosecutors get
closer to "Mr. Big," but the penalty for subordinates drops sharp-
ly. The real losers are the insignificant couriers and go-betweens,
who are involved with quantities large enough to generate a long
sentence but who are too low on the totem pole to have useful in-
formation that would enable them to make a deal."
Item three in the search for "Mr. Big" is Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), one of the darlings of
recent federal enforcement policy. This elite unit, created in the
late 1980s, targets high-level distributors and international net-
works. It attracts the brightest and toughest prosecutors, togeth-
er with a budget of $384 million for fiscal year 1994.' To put
this figure in perspective, consider that in fiscal year 1988, well
into the Drug War but before OCDETF was formed, the DEA
spent $492 million, a hefty sum for the time.65 Federal prison
average, of $24,500 per year, or a total of $980,000 in 1988 dollars over a 40-year period.
'o USSC §2D1.1(c)(3) (cited in note 54) (base offense level of 38); id, ch 5, Part A (lev-
el 38 guideline range of 235-293 months for first offender).
" Kleiman and Cavanagh estimate that lost wages of imprisoned felons and costs of
supporting a prisoner's dependents add further average expenses of $17,408 per prisoner
per year. See Kleiman and Cavanagh, A Cost Benefit Analysis at 17 (cited in note 59).
6 18 USC §3553(e) (provision that, on the prosecutor's motion, a judge may impose
sentence lower than the mandatory minimum, based on the defendant's substantial assis-
tance in the investigation or prosecution of others); USSC §5K1.1 (provision that, on
prosecutor's motion, a judge may depart downward from guideline sentencing range,
based on the defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
others) (cited in note 54).
' See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 Wake Forest L
Rev 199, 211-13 (1993) (discussing the "cooperation paradox" in which drug sentencing
policy produces more serious penalties for less serious offenders); United States v
Bringham, 977 F2d 317, 318 (7th Cir 1992) (discussing "inverted sentencing").
See Budget Summary, 1994 at 3 (cited in note 3).
ONDCP, 1989 National Drug Control Strategy at 122 (cited in note 38).
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expenditures for incarcerating drug law violators totalled $446
million, and the combined drug enforcement expenditures of all
U.S. Attorneys Offices was only $81 million." These budgets
have grown rapidly; the DEA's budget grew to $774 million, and
the U.S. Attorneys' budget increased to $208 million for 1994.67
But OCDETF's claim for 1994 is almost double that budgeted for
the U.S. Attorneys and almost as large as the entire 1988 bud-
gets for the DEA or the federal prisons.
Without doubt, OCDETF work is extremely difficult and
challenging. But is the money well spent? Again, skeptics ques-
tion whether efforts directed against big "kingpins" can make any
dent in the resilient distribution networks. No drug cartel is a
mindless and unmotivated collection of automatons, incapable of
functioning the minute its leadership is removed. Underlings,
competitors, and new entrants stand ready to step in enthusiasti-
cally when law enforcement creates a vacancy.' The other cor-
nerstones of current enforcement policy-sharply escalating pen-
alties and the focus on mitigating small cases in order to work up
to bigger ones-are dubious for the same reasons.
Though enforcement enthusiasts sometimes question these
conclusions, the pessimistic assessment of supply-side prospects
is by now widely shared. What I want to stress here, however, is
a point that goes beyond the factual assumptions underlying
enforcement strategy. As we have seen, the hoped-for successes,
if they ever materialize, will cut drug consumption only by driv-
ing up price. This "victory" will fuel predatory crime and aggra-
vate organizational violence, which catches innocents as well as
bad guys in the cross fire. Again, this expensive strategy is a
poor choice even if proponents are right about its potential effec-
tiveness.
What about the links between supply and demand stressed
in ONDCS Reports? ("When street prices for drugs go up, and
drug availability declines, then fewer people are likely to seek
out drugs and consume them. In other words,... 'supply
reduction' is in fact aimed at reducing demand as well."69) This
approach, we can now see, is confused, if not deliberately mis-
leading. A price increase produced by aggressive law enforcement
will of course reduce consumption. But this reduction is not the
6 Id.
67 Budget Summary, 1994 at 3 (cited in note 3).
68 See text accompanying notes 26-29.
ONDCP, 1989 National Drug Control Strategy at 112-13 (cited in note 38).
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result of a decrease in demand; it reflects only a price-determined
decrease in the quantity demanded. The difference is not simply
semantic. Genuine demand reduction means that users purchase
less at constant prices. Dealer revenue falls, and the criminogenic
effects of supply-side strategies are avoided. Just the reverse is
true when law enforcement reduces "demand" by driving prices
upward.
Thus, contrary to the prevailing articles of faith, pursuing
"Mr. Big" should be placed very low on our list of enforcement
priorities. Attacks on production and distribution produce ambig-
uous benefits even when they succeed.
B. Treatment
Treatment programs offer an obvious vehicle for attacking
drug demand directly. While official rhetoric touts the goal of
reducing drug use, the current shortage of treatment facilities
and the lack of support for quality programs is no less than a
national scandal.
In a peculiar twist, Drug Czar William Bennett's first
ONDCP Report, issued in September 1989, defended its law
enforcement emphasis as, in part, a treatment strategy, stating
that "[wihen we vigorously enforce drug laws we achieve a num-
ber of related goals: we get the dealers and users off the
street... we direct those needing treatment to the help they
might not have sought on their own."" Pressuring addicts to
seek help makes sense when there are facilities prepared to treat
them. Yet news articles over the preceding year documented the
inadequacy of inner city treatment facilities,7' and ONDCP itself
acknowledged a lack of treatment capacity and long waiting lists
in urban areas.72
In fairness to ONDCP, it consistently recommended funds for
more treatment slots. But the amounts sought were inadequate
to meet current needs, while supply-side enforcement efforts
enjoyed priority. Though it presented law enforcement as a
"treatment" strategy, ONDCP policies did not force addicts into
treatment. It forced them onto waiting lists. Meanwhile, the
funds needed to treat those who already sought help remained
unavailable. The results included thousands of addicts on waiting
70 Id at 17.
71 See, for example, A Good Way to Fight Drugs and AIDS, NY Times A34 (Dec 8,
1988).
72 ONDCP, 1989 National Drug Control Strategy at 39 (cited in note 38).
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lists and delays of up to eight months in Los Angeles and other
cities; countless discouraged addicts either gave up and returned
to the drug life, or never bothered applying for help.73 The latest
strategy report issued by ONDCP seems to put increased stress
on the importance of expanding the Nation's drug treatment
capacity,74 but so far, the new Administration has made no dra-
matically visible change in its funding priorities. The increased
appropriations recommended for treatment are 7 percent more
than in 1993 and 18 percent more than in 1992, almost precisely
parallel to the increases recommended for criminal justice expen-
ditures, which were 8 percent and 18 percent respectively.75
Why not make treatment available to every addict who seeks
it? ONDCP officials have not dismissed this as an unattainable
goal but have criticized it as undesirable. Herbert Kleber, who
was Bennett's Deputy Director for Demand Reduction, wrote in a
New York Times Op-Ed piece that treatment on demand "won't
work" because in designing treatment techniques "we do not have
all the answers," and because "only half, at best, of cocaine ad-
dicts are drug-free one to two years after treatment."7 Further,
Kleber worried that some addicts "seek only to ... reduce their
tolerance so the same high is achieved from lower and cheaper
doses. 77
These are disappointing comments, especially from a special-
ist who once led ONDCP's "demand reduction" effort. They imply
a commitment to demand elimination, but nothing less. Kleber's
insistence that treatment programs demonstrate something close
to perfect effectiveness presents an interesting contrast to the
standards by which interdiction and other supply reduction strat-
egies are judged. If "only" 50 percent of cocaine addicts remain
drug-free one to two years after treatment, the reduction in ag-
gregate demand-and the corresponding social benefit-is enor-
mous.7" Kleber's concern about addicts who manipulate the
treatment system is similarly misplaced. While we hope to get
addicts completely free of drugs, there is a clear demand-reduc-
"' Michel Marriott, Addicts Awaiting Treatment Often Face Delays and Panic, NY
Times Al (Jan 10, 1990).
"' See ONDCP, 1993 National Drug Control Strategy 7 (1993).
71 See Table 1 at page 214.
" Herbert D. Kieber, No Quick Fixes for Drug Addicts, NY Times A31 (Jan 26, 1990).
77 Id.
"' Two million Americans are expected to receive drug treatment in 1993. See
ONDCP, 1992 National Drug Control Strategy 57-58 (1992).
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tion benefit when an addict merely reduces his tolerance and
uses lower doses.
Though treatment programs are no panacea, the case for
more effort in this direction is overwhelming. If half of those with
drug problems can be treated (a not unreasonable goal79) and if
half of these can be kept drug-free for two years, the result would
be a massive reduction in demand, with unambiguous gains for
public policy. Nothing remotely comparable lies ahead for any of
our costly supply-side enforcement techniques.
C. Education
Lasting reductions in demand require special emphasis on
education about drugs. Educational efforts have probably played
some role in reducing the appeal of drugs to middle-class users,
though independent shifts in health attitudes seem to have been
a more important factor.80 Underclass consumers responsible for
much of the demand for crack present an even more difficult
challenge.81 Because realistic opportunities for personal growth
or economic advancement are so often lacking in the inner city,
the escape into drugs is not simply an irrational behavior that a
few health warnings can cure.
Because we do not yet know how to reduce underclass attrac-
tion to crack, research and experimentation are imperative. Inex-
pensive information, awareness, and peer counseling programs
are surely worth more than the perfunctory attention they are
typically given. At a more ambitious level, improved schools, job
training, and scattered site housing for welfare recipients would
surely tend to reduce long-term cocaine demand, and of course
would be worthwhile for their own sake, if funds could be found
to support them. In the meantime, spending to incarcerate deal-
ers, near $1.5 billion in current federal funds alone," is often
counterproductive, as this approach has no direct impact on
underclass demand and increases predatory crime and organiza-
tional violence with every decrease in drug consumption.
7 Id at 39-43.
See Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition at 945 (cited in note 5).
81 See Botvin, Substance Abuse Prevention at 510 (cited in note 15).
82 See Budget Summary, 1994 at 3 (cited in note 3).
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D. Street-level Enforcement
Supply/demand effects are the most complex in this area.
Street sweeps and arrests of retail dealers restrict availability, a
supply-side effect that tends to raise dollar prices. These tactics
also mean that users must spend more time looking for sellers
and may have to go into dangerous neighborhoods to find them.
As enforcement drives up these "search costs," buyers are willing
to buy less at any given price.83 In other words, demand is re-
duced and prices then fall. Arresting users has the same effect:
as the buyer's risk of punishment increases, his willingness to
buy falls.
Most economists would deny that these effects represent
genuine reductions in demand. Rather, they would say that
search costs and expected punishment costs are part of the
"price" the buyer pays. Street-level enforcement drives up "price,"
so the quantity sold decreases even though underlying demand is
unchanged. But if this is a supply-side effect, its implications are
the reverse of conventional supply reduction that attacks produc-
tion and distribution to raise dollar prices. In the latter case,
social gains from reduced consumption are offset by higher pric-
es, which drive predatory crime and organizational violence. An
increase in non-monetary price has the opposite effect. Buyers
cannot finance higher non-monetary prices, such as search time
and expected punishment, by committing more predatory crime.
Dealers cannot collect non-monetary prices and channel them to
Swiss bank accounts. Thus, supply-side increases in the buyer's
non-monetary price have the same unambiguous advantages as
genuine reductions in demand: consumption drops and monetary
price falls; predatory crime, dealer revenue, and organizational
violence all decrease.
This analysis suggests that attempts to work up to "Mr. Big"
are not only dubious but perverse. The more that enforcement
moves away from the retail level to focus on larger dealers and
"kingpins," the more that success will increase only the monetary
component of price. The goal instead should be to drive up the
non-monetary price, so that buyers make "payments" that cannot
be financed by predatory crime and cannot line drug cartel trea-
suries. This means focusing on search costs and expected punish-
ments at the retail level or, in other words, on the costs assumed
' See Mark H. Moore, Achieving Discrimination on the Effective Price of Heroin, 63(2)
American Economic Review 70 (1973).
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by the smallest buyers and sellers. Instead of working up to "Mr.
Big," we should be working down the chain to retail sellers and
to the customers whose willingness to pay is the real source of
the drug problem.
This recommendation to focus enforcement on retail sellers
and users raises both practical and philosophical problems. Philo-
sophically, the typical drug user, especially the addict, appears as
a victim. Justice seems to require harsh punishment for the drug
lord who gets rich by exploiting a user's weaknesses. To turn our
punishment scale upside down would be unthinkable. But the
addict need not face a twenty- or forty-year prison term. Pretrial
diversion into treatment makes sense for the first arrest; recidi-
vists might face terms of one to three months, coupled always
with treatment for those who seem amenable. Penalties need not
be draconian, so long as the user's risk of arrest and conviction is
steadily increased.
There are two practical problems. First, retail dealing and
consumption often occur out of sight in alleys or private residen-
ces. While street sweeps have proven effective against open drug
markets, they have been unsuccessful in combatting these "dis-
creet" sales." Clandestine retail sales should be no harder to
penetrate, however, than clandestine distribution networks and
warehouses. In fact, the retail level should be easier to penetrate
because informants have much less to fear from those whom they
expose.
Above all, success in containing street-level markets requires
a change in law enforcement attitudes. Police and prosecutors
disdain the "two-bit case." Retailers and users are either not
arrested, quickly dismissed, or allowed to plead out and return
immediately to the streets. Meanwhile, enforcement energy focus-
es on the challenging and seemingly more important task of
finding big distributors.s5 This emphasis means that every deal-
er caught is seen as a resource in the search for higher-ups. Drug
agents pressure him to finger his supplier, and the supplier is
pressured to finger his own supplier, and so on, up to the "real
See Mark A. R. Kleiman and Kerry D. Smith, State and Local Drug Enforcement:
In Search of a Strategy, in Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson, eds, 13 Crime and Jus-
tice: A Review of Research 69, 85 (University of Chicago Press, 1990); Marcia R. Chaiken,
ed, Street-Level Drug Enforcement: Examining the Issues (Abt. Associates, 1988).
' Mark Kleiman notes, "The belief that high-level enforcement is the real drug war,
and that enforcement nearer the street is merely a series of holding actions,
is ... common among [federal and] state police forces and the elite special narcotics units
of some big-city police departments." Kleiman, Against Excess at 136 (cited in note 20).
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source." We need instead to pursue his buyers, and pursue them
all the way down to the user. Deterrence or incapacitation of
"Mr. Big" only makes room for another ambitious dealer. Deter-
rence or incapacitation of users more effectively hurts the cartels
by making a permanent dent in demand.
The second practical problem is one of resources. At the
retail level, the number of sellers and users is enormous. As
Mark Kleiman notes, attempts to intervene effectively at the
retail level "pose a massive operational, organizational, and even
political challenge for police management.""6 Part of the answer
is to concentrate on community policing strategies that make use
of neighborhood resistance and mobilize the resources of other
public agencies, without necessarily generating arrests and prose-
cutions."7 Another part of the answer is to turn draconian, quan-
tity-driven sentences of mid-level sellers into more numerous but
shorter and more productive sentences for retail sellers and us-
ers. One mid-level dealer may draw thirty years of imprisonment;
for the same resources we can sentence 120 small sellers to three
months each. But this is not a complete answer, especially for the
short run: the retail focus requires all 120 jail cells right now.
Limited prison capacity, along with overburdened police, prosecu-
tors, and courts, have proven major obstacles to street-level en-
forcement in a number of cities."
Yet vigorous retail enforcement need not swamp the judicial
system if initial sanctions are modest and if court officials are
prepared for the influx. The Washington, D.C. court system coped
well with a crackdown that was well planned and systematically
implemented.89 With the resources required to give one dealer a
thirty-year sentence, or 120 small sellers a sentence of three
months each, we can place several hundred users on intensive-
supervision probation.° Other useful but relatively inexpensive
sanctions include pretrial diversion into treatment, substantial
fines or overnight jail stays for nonaddict users, and short (fifteen
to thirty day) jail terms for a first repeat offense. Provided that
" Id at 144.
87 Id at 145.
Kleiman and Smith, State and Local Drug Enforcement at 87 (cited in note 84).
'9 Id.
'o A Rand Corporation study found unexpectedly high program and court costs in
several California counties using intensive-supervision probation. See Joan Petersilia and
Susan Turner, Intensive Supervision for High-Risk Probationers: Findings From Three
California Experiments xi (Rand Corporation, 1990). But the estimated average costs
($7,240 to $8,902 per offender per year) are still less than half the annual cost per offend-
er of incarceration. Id. See text accompanying note 59.
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retail-level sentences have real bite and that the risks of appre-
hension become serious, we can begin to deter many sellers and
users for each one we actually arrest. Carefully planned, selective
enforcement can maintain pressure on retailers without absorb-
ing unlimited funds or diverting attention from other important
police priorities." In addition, a shift in strategy at the federal
level would release enormous resources to ease the strain on local
law enforcement. Simply scaling back international efforts, inter-
diction, and OCDETF to 1988 funding levels would free almost
$1.5 billion for retail level initiatives. By contrast, in 1992 five
"high intensity drug trafficking areas" with the worst prob-
lems-New York, Los Angeles, Miami, Houston, and the South-
west Border-together received a paltry $36 million in federal
grants to state and local enforcement agencies.
Above all, federal budget makers, local prosecutors, and
judges all need to understand the importance of the "two bit
case." We cannot attack the drug problem at its "source" by ex-
posing "Mr. Big" or by obliterating the Andean coca crop. To do
it, we must attack, and attack seriously, the user's willingness to
buy.
CONCLUSION
The drug problem has posed a harrowing dilemma for Ameri-
can social policy in the 1990s. New and more dangerous drugs
threaten public health and safety, but law enforcement drives up
drug prices and generates additional violence and predatory
crime in the very process of attempting to restrict consumption.
We rightly hesitate to legalize dangerous drugs, but we shudder
at the massive resources invested in our draconian but partly
counterproductive law enforcement effort.
We need not choose between the harms of drug use and the
harms of drug enforcement. We can avoid the dilemma, but to do
so we must radically reverse the strategy and assumptions that
guide the drug control effort. In theoretical terms, we must em-
phasize demand reduction rather than supply reduction and raise
the buyer's nonmonetary cost rather than the dollar price of
drugs. In practical terms, we must assign a low priority to inter-
national initiatives, interdiction efforts, and costly attempts to
" See Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence, in
Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, eds, 12 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 1, 6-7
(University of Chicago Press, 1990).
' ONDCP, 1992 National Drug Control Strategy at 134 (cited in note 78).
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disable the big cartels. We must stop the perverse justice of im-
posing absurdly expensive multidecade prison terms on couriers
and lookouts while more knowledgeable co-conspirators get re-
duced charges and short sentences to reward their cooperation.
We must pay more attention to local conditions, to education, to
treatment, and to related community initiatives to discourage
drug use.
This approach does not imply "decriminalization," or a shift
to an entirely therapeutic, public-health approach. Law enforce-
ment remains a vital component of the demand reduction effort.
But the emphasis must be on retail-level enforcement that clears
the streets, protects local neighborhoods, and makes it difficult
for users to find and buy drugs with impunity. Instead of work-
ing up the ladder to "Mr. Big," law enforcement must concentrate
on working down the ladder, locating users and blocking their
willingness and ability to buy. With this reversal of thinking and
strategy, we can hope to address our serious drug problem con-
structively, without in the process causing more problems than
we solve.
